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Abstract 
This article conceptualizes the energy problems facing society from a global governance perspective. It 
argues that a notion of “global energy governance,” taken to mean international collective action efforts 
undertaken to manage and distribute energy resources and provide energy services, offers a meaningful 
and useful framework for assessing energy-related challenges. The article begins by exploring the 
concepts of governance, global governance, and global energy governance. It then examines some of the 
existing institutions in place to establish and carry out rules and norms governing global energy problems 
and describes the range of institutional design options available to policymakers. It briefly traces the role 
of a selection of these institutions, from inter-governmental organizations to summit processes to 
multilateral development banks to global action networks, in responding to energy issues, and points out 
their strengths and weaknesses. The article concludes by analyzing how the various approaches to global 
governance differ in their applicability to addressing the conundrums of global energy problems. 
 
Keywords: Global governance, Energy governance, Energy policy 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the past several years, issues concerning energy fuels and services have assumed a prominent role in 
national and international policy agendas around the world. Despite this prominence, however, 
governments and other actors have proven remarkably ineffective at coordinating across borders on 
energy issues. Energy services are provided through a mix of government mandates and (often badly 
regulated and distorted) markets. To a substantial degree, these are international markets. But there are 
enormous gaps in the international system's capacity to manage energy commodities, address their 
externalities, and ensure a successful transition over time to low-carbon sources. 
 
It is clear that international energy markets suffer from lack of appropriate governance. Price signals in 
these markets are distorted by national government policies on both the supply and the demand side. 
Investment in future energy supply is often inadequate and fails to serve the public interest, leading to 
extreme price volatility. Because national governments see energy services as crucial to national security 
and national power, they intervene in the sector to promote energy “independence” or at least to assure 
supplies. Yet governments largely fail to regulate energy in other key international aspects, such as 
climate change and other forms of cross-border pollution such as emissions of mercury and acid rain.1 
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These multiple failures reflect governance shortcomings at both national and international levels. 
Nationally, few if any governments are well structured to govern energy issues, much less participate in 
effective systems of global energy governance. “Energy” problems cross a varied set of policy domains 
and agendas, from military interests such as securing sea lanes for oil shipments to environmental 
interests such as managing environmental spillovers to humanitarian interests such as addressing human 
rights issues connected with resource extraction. These are dealt with by different bureaucratic silos and 
analyzed by separate groups of experts and policymakers. Internationally, the governance picture is even 
more incoherent. Energy is governed piecemeal, mostly in ad-hoc responses involving specific countries 
or groups of countries and any of a wide number of non-governmental actors. As this article will describe, 
these non-governmental actors include a number of innovative partnerships and networks of governments, 
civil society organizations, and corporations, which aim to fill some of the many gaps in global energy 
governance. But the piecemeal nature of these initiatives, as well, and the lack of adequate governmental 
engagement have created an incoherent policy landscape littered with uncoordinated efforts. 
 
Incoherence at the global energy policy level is mirrored in academia. Strikingly, the patchwork of 
organizations and institutions mandated to address various aspects of energy governance has received 
almost no scholarly attention, despite the extraordinary importance of energy in current international 
affairs. The contrast with the extensive literature on global and regional governance in other issue areas is 
as dramatic as it is troubling.2 In the past decade, virtually no publications have rigorously assessed any of 
the institutions of energy governance. Little scholarship addresses how the existing institutional 
infrastructure compares with various expectations for the global public goods that need to be provided to 
ensure the supply of energy services, or identifies where institutional gaps exist. Conversely, the energy 
policy literature tends to emphasize the technological or economic aspects of energy systems, markets, 
and policy decisions. To the degree that the energy policy literature takes a more holistic approach, it 
focuses overwhelmingly on national policy and fails to take the global context into account. 
 
This article contends that improvements in energy policymaking at all levels require a new dialogue 
between the energy policy community and global governance scholars. The article begins by identifying 
what global governance processes aim to accomplish and the range of tools and approaches that can be 
utilized. To illustrate how these processes work, and how they vary, it moves on to identify some of the 
existing institutions in place to “govern” global energy problems, tracing the roles of inter-governmental 
organizations such as the International Energy Agency, summit processes such as the Group of Eight, 
global multi-sectoral networks such as the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership 
(REEEP), and multilateral development agencies such as the Asian Development Bank. It concludes with 
a brief assessment of the strengths and shortcomings of each type of approach to global governance. 
 
2. Governance and global governance theory 
While many people may believe that “governance” is just a fancy term for “government,” governments 
are only one of the means through which governance can be achieved. Although most academic research 
on public policy and international relations still focuses primarily on what governments do, in recent 
decades many scholars have begun to address governance that occurs outside of formal governmental 
structures at scales ranging from small communities to the world as a whole. International relations 
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scholars have a particular interest in non-governmental governance, given the absence of any prospect of 
a formal world government to govern global-scale issues (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). 
 
Governance refers to any of the myriad processes through which a group of people set and enforce the 
rules needed to enable that group to achieve desired outcomes. There is a vast literature exploring the 
conditions under which such rules are needed and under which they can function effectively. Here, we 
draw on that literature to develop a framework for understanding the needs and possibilities for global 
energy governance. 
 
At the core of the need for rules – the need for governance – are two fundamental problems. First is what 
is known as the “public goods” problem (Samuelson, 1954). Markets, despite their extraordinary success 
in matching human desires for consumption with producers of goods and services, also regularly fail to 
provide certain categories of goods and services that people want, because the incentives of producers and 
consumers are misaligned. Even when a group of people share a desire for such goods and services as 
effective protection of property rights, provision of basic education for all residents, or national defense, 
they may not be able to turn to the free market. No one has an individual incentive to produce such goods, 
because once they are produced, everyone gets the benefits of them, even if they do not pay for the goods. 
Thus, the “consumers” can free-ride. “Producers,” knowing the consumers will not pay, do not produce 
(Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1982; Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Sandler, 1992). 
 
The technical term for such goods and services is “public goods”. Public goods are defined as products 
and services that are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption—i.e., once they exist, no consumer 
can be excluded from consuming them, and no one's consumption interferes with the ability of other 
consumers to consume them. National defense is the usual example of a public good in this sense. Few 
goods or services correspond fully to these exacting requirements, but the more “publicness” they exhibit, 
the less likely it is that markets will provide them. Thus governance is required to organize their 
production. Some goods exhibit only one of the two characteristics. Common pool resources, as 
eloquently described in Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968), are non-excludable but rival, 
as in a common grazing area. Ostrom's work demonstrates a wide range of real-world solutions to 
sustainably governing common pool resources, often in the absence of formal governmental mechanisms. 
Both pure public goods and common pool resources create free-rider problems that require governance. 
 
Overcoming the free-rider problem requires several steps. First, there has to be some agreement on who 
gets to make rules and against whom will the rules be enforced–—in other words, who constitutes the 
group to be included in the “collective” of “collective action.” Second, some system for deciding what 
goods or services the group wants that the market would not fully provide must exist. Third, consensus 
must occur regarding what rules it will put in place to get the goods or services provided and who will pay 
what share of the cost of producing those goods (highly political questions that often see the more 
powerful imposing rules and payment requirements on the less powerful). Fourth, the system of 
monitoring who is actually paying – and making shirkers pay – is essential. 
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The second problem requiring governance is encapsulated in the notion of “externalities.” An externality 
is produced as an incidental byproduct of an activity and can be positive or negative. The most obvious 
example of a negative externality is environmental pollution. A factory dumping its waste into a river has 
no particular incentive to pollute its downstream neighbors—that is just the cheapest way of dealing with 
its waste. Put another way, an externality is not a result of deliberate intent. There are many ways to 
handle such externalities: develop rules that forbid such dumping (e.g., traditional government 
regulation); develop a contract between the downstream neighbors and the factory such that the neighbors 
pay the costs of alternative waste disposal (which may be cheaper for them than the costs imposed by the 
pollution); or develop alternative technologies that do not pollute. All such measures require some degree 
of governance to set and enforce rules, monitor compliance, and/or channel resources to socially desirable 
ends. 
 
We are accustomed to assuming that all this is the task of national governments. Humanity is divided 
along territorial boundaries into states, each of which has its own governments that make and enforce the 
rules. But this assumption has run into three sets of problems. First, many national governments have 
little capacity to make and enforce rules in any reasonable reflection of the public interest, and their 
failures have serious spillover effects on citizens of other lands. As the growing literature on “state 
failure” makes clear, the scores of countries whose governments are unable to provide basic public goods 
(such as law and order, opportunities for jobs and education, or maintenance of at least a minimal level of 
environmental sustainability) sow disorder beyond their borders in such forms as refugee flows and 
havens for terrorism and organized crime, as well as their inability to participate productively in 
international cooperative efforts (Esty et al., 1998). 
 
Second, globalization has both increased the demands on national governments and made it more difficult 
for them to govern, as the current global economic crisis makes clear, and citizens have ever-higher 
expectations of what governments will provide (stability, prosperity, opportunity and security) at the same 
time that globalization reduces the capacity of national governments to control events within their own 
borders (Florini, 2003, pp. 61–88). 
 
Third, some issues inherently require decision-making across national boundaries—yet the world's 
anarchical political structure makes such cross-border rule-setting extraordinarily difficult. That global 
structure – humanity divided into distinct units on territorial lines – rests on the fundamental principle of 
national sovereignty. That principle asserts that each of the roughly 200 countries in the world is entitled 
to do whatever it pleases within its national boundaries. Sovereignty has never been so absolute in 
practice, of course, with governments regularly trying to interfere in one way or another in what goes on 
behind the borders of other countries. Indeed, one of the leading books on the subject is entitled 
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Krasner, 1999). Governments do deliberately constrain their 
sovereign freedom of action by adhering to international agreements. Moreover, over the past several 
decades, growing economic interdependence, assertions of universal human rights values, and increasing 
awareness of the cross-border impacts of domestic mismanagement have all put pressure on assertions of 
sovereignty. The adoption of the “responsibility to protect” principle in 2005 at the United Nations put 
virtually all governments on record as supporting a startling derogation of the principle of sovereignty, 
asserting that when national governments fail to fulfill their responsibility to protect the fundamental 
rights of their citizens, the international community has the right to intervene (United Nations General 
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Assembly, 2005). But it remains the case that there is no overarching decision-maker to make, enforce, or 
even coordinate rules across borders, and no prospect of one. International order remains anarchical, and 
governments continue to jealously guard their sovereign prerogatives. 
 
This mismatch between the needs for global rules and the national scale of decision-making has sparked 
the new field of global governance: how is it possible to succeed at rule-making and problem-solving at 
the global level in the absence of a global government? The options are many. The traditional approach is 
for governments to come to agreements in the form of treaties. But too often, negotiating such agreements 
takes years if not decades. Sometime, soft measures, such as persuasion and technical assistance, suffice 
to induce governments to pay the costs of complying with agreements (Chayes and Chayes, 1998). But if 
those prove inadequate, the alternatives are such blunt instruments (economic sanctions, war) that few 
governments are willing to bear the costs of imposing them.3 Governments also create inter-governmental 
organizations, such as the United Nations or the International Energy Agency, which largely serve to 
gather information, provide expertise, and/or serve as a forum for inter-governmental negotiation, 
although sometimes their secretariats find wiggle room for limited independent action. To a limited 
extent, the heads of particularly powerful governments get together to engage in discussions about various 
issues in such “summit” processes as the Group of Eight industrialized nations (which looks well on its 
way to being transformed into a Group of Twenty under the pressures of the current global economic 
crisis (Bradford, 2009)). International relations scholars have given the somewhat confusing name 
“regime” to describe the various sets of principles, rules, norms, and decision-making procedures, both 
formal and informal, which “govern” how states cooperate to handle border-crossing issues (Krasner, 
1983). 
 
But governments and the inter-governmental organizations and regimes they create are only a piece of the 
global governance picture. Innumerable other “governors” – actors with the authority to make rules – 
populate the scene. The private sector sometimes makes its own rules to regulate its own activities, in 
addition to having a powerful voice at the governmental regulatory table (Cutler et al., 1999; Braithwaite 
and Drahos, 2000; Haufler, 2001). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often raise the issues that 
end up on the global agenda, frequently monitor the behavior of individual countries and corporations, 
and increasingly participate directly in negotiations among governments and/or corporations (Florini, 
2006). This already complex picture of global governance is rendered increasingly complex by the 
bewildering array of partnerships among these many actors (Waddell and Khagram, 2007; van Tongeren, 
2007). 
 
The energy field is replete with public goods problems and externalities, many of which cross-borders and 
thus are beyond the scope of individual national governments to address on their own. Energy security as 
currently defined, for example, depends heavily on the reliable functioning of international oil markets—
and all markets and trading systems require rules that enable participants to obtain relevant information 
and enforce contracts. Climate change is the most obvious example of an energy-related negative 
externality requiring extensive, border-crossing governance. Many of the proposed solutions to both 
energy insecurity and climate change will require extensive governance innovations, such as effective 
intellectual property rights systems that promote rapid and affordable innovation and dissemination of 
new energy technologies. All such innovations requires institutions—systems for developing, 
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implementing, and if necessary enforcing the rules. As the remainder of this paper argues, there are many 
types of institutions that may be of use for global energy governance. 
 
If the world is ever to enjoy energy security – reliable, affordable, and efficient access to energy services 
– and make the transition to a low-carbon energy system without extraordinary disruption and human 
suffering, a full assortment of global governance mechanisms will need to come into play. Doing so 
effectively requires a conversation between those with expertise in the complex specific of energy issues 
and those with expertise in the equally complex questions of governance at the global-scale. This 
conversation begins by investigating some of the existing global governors relating to energy. 
 
3. Governing energy: who are the global governors? 
No article can address the full panoply of actors and processes currently or potentially relevant to an 
analysis of global energy governance. Thus, this article focuses on a small sample of exemplars to 
illustrate the range of global governors attempting to promote global energy governance. We have chosen 
four types of international institutions for our analysis: an inter-governmental organization, a summit 
process, a multilateral development bank, and a public–private partnership. The IEA was selected because 
it is both a leading actor in energy with an extensive track record and a formally constituted inter-
governmental organization, with limited membership, a charter signed by its member states, a budget 
based on members’ contributions, and a secretariat to do the bidding of the member governments—in 
other words, a good exemplar on grounds of both form and substance. The G8 was chosen because it is 
among the best known of numerous summit processes that bring together heads of government or top 
ministers and because it has frequently addressed energy issues. The Asian Development Bank was 
depicted because it is a prominent member of the family of multilateral development banks (a family that 
also includes the better-known International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or World Bank), 
whose decisions on project lending, financial guarantees, and promotion of “best practices” have 
enormous influence on the energy strategies and policy choices of scores of countries. REEEP was 
selected because it exemplifies the increasingly common “hybrid” organizations that draw private actors 
into efforts to solve global problems. The following four subsections elaborate on the history of each of 
these organizations, describe their structure, assess their mission and agenda, and explore current 
challenges and future prospects for effective governance. 
 
3.1. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
Inter-governmental organizations – IGOs – are the most easily recognized institutional form of global 
governance.4 IGOs range from such well-known bodies as the United Nations, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and the World Health Organization (WHO), to an alphabet soup of scores of obscure 
entities.5 Created and funded by national governments, they generally have Secretariats that answer to 
some type of inter-governmental governing body – such as the UN General Assembly – which provides 
the organizations’ mandates and keeps tabs on its activities. Some are open to virtually all countries, 
while others serve a more limited membership. 
 
 7 
 
International relations scholars hotly debate the importance and utility of IGOs. A major school of 
thought that falls under the heading of “realist” or “neo-realist” sees them as generally insignificant 
amplifiers of the power of a few national governments. One prominent proponent of this school of 
thought referred slightingly to belief in a positive role for organizations like the United Nations as no 
more than “escapism” from the rigorous realities of power politics (Morgenthau, 1962). That dismissive 
perspective has been challenged for several decades by leading scholars of the “neo-liberal” school, who 
view IGOs as limited but useful, even crucial, mechanisms to enable governments to more easily manage 
shared problems by lowering the transactions costs of negotiation and implementation and by providing a 
common information base for decision-making (Keohane, 1984).6 A smaller but rapidly growing body of 
the literature focuses on IGOs – the governing bodies and/or the secretariats – as significant actors in their 
own right, able to influence the course of world events with some (limited) degree of autonomy (Barnett 
and Finnemore, 2004; Jolly et al., 2010). Thus in addressing the roles that IGOs can play in global energy 
governance, it would be useful to look at their roles in lowering transactions costs for governments, 
providing information, and acting autonomously. 
 
International relations scholars have paid scant attention to the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
which, despite a membership that is limited to member states of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), has for several decades been perhaps the most influential IGO in 
the energy field. A rare exception is the analysis carried out by the most prominent of the neo-liberal 
scholars, Robert Keohane, in the 1980s (Keohane, 1984). He focused on the IEA's role in enabling 
member governments to lower the transactions costs of cooperating to achieve shared goals. At its 
creation, the IEA's founders (wealthy oil-consuming nations) intended it to enable them to coordinate 
effective responses to oil price volatility, following the spikes during the 1973 Arab–Israeli war. Members 
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had increased oil prices and imposed oil 
sales embargoes to countries they considered over friendly to Israel (Strange, 1998). Towards the end of 
1973, global oil supplies had fallen by 7% (Keohane, 1984). The major-oil-consuming countries at the 
time, all members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), responded 
with competitive behaviors such as stockpiling and hoarding of oil reserves, thus exacerbating the 
economic costs to all. A proposal by the OECD Secretariat for an oil-sharing arrangement to stem the 
panic never took off. However, by early 1974, it was clear that an organized response was needed. An 
international energy conference convened by the US and including major oil-consuming countries in the 
OECD led to the International Energy Program, which established the IEA (Scott, 1994). 
 
Since then, the IEA has established reporting systems on oil prices, supply and stock positions. 
Significantly, it has also created an emergency oil-sharing system that authorizes the IEA Secretariat to 
set the system into motion when it deems fit. The IEA has not always been effective in curbing price 
shocks. When the 1979 Iranian revolution sparked off competitive behaviors among importing member 
countries, causing a doubling in oil prices, the IEA chose (in vain) to attempt to informally coordinate its 
members’ actions instead of using the oil-sharing system. Part of the reason for the informal approach 
was the difficulty in getting IEA member governments to formally agree on how best to manage and use 
the oil stockpiles (Keohane, 1984). 
 
Nevertheless, over time the IEA has had better success in coordinating responses among importing 
countries to shocks and disruptions in global oil markets. For instance, at the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq 
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war in 1980, the IEA Secretariat was able to use its powers of persuasion to prevent the competitive 
behaviors that had occurred during other crises (Keohane, 1984). Since then, the IEA members’ more 
than four billion barrels of strategic petroleum reserves have helped to deter market manipulations (IEA, 
2008a). Through coordinated IEA actions, the strategic petroleum reserves have been tapped into on two 
occasions: the first occurred a day before the 1991 Iraq war to quell fears of insufficient oil supplies in the 
market, and the second occurred in response to the devastating hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico that had 
destroyed oil production, distribution and refining industries in Louisiana and Mississippi (IEA, 2008a). 
The collective IEA actions, on both instances, ensured the continuity of oil supply, preventing severe oil 
market disruptions. 
 
In addition to facilitating coordination of action of governments, a crucial role for many IGOs is that of 
keeper of the world's statistics and source of authoritative information on energy supply and demand 
balances and energy research and development. Today, the IEA is widely considered an authority on 
energy market projections, churning out numerous regular publications on energy statistics and issues, by 
drawing on the expertise of its energy experts and statisticians from member countries. On average, the 
IEA publishes around 40 books a year. Some of its publications, such as the annual World Energy 
Outlook and the Key World Energy Statistics, are regarded as leading informational sources for 
governments and the energy private sector. The IEA also publishes country reviews on energy policies of 
its member countries and monthly energy statistics such as the Monthly Oil Survey. 
 
But the informational role of IGOs is not limited to technical data-gathering. By selecting data to be 
gathered and choosing how to present information, IGOs can influence what issues get attention and how 
they are addressed. For example, since its inception, the IEA has taken an active role in conducting 
energy research, compiling and publishing data for public dissemination. 
 
In addition, IGOs can shape what governments think they ought to be doing, generating norms of 
appropriate behavior and best practice. It seems plausible that the IEA could play this role, although to 
date, little scholarly analysis has evaluated the IEA's role in shaping how its member states, other 
governments, or private actors conceptualize energy policy options. Given the highly technical nature of 
the energy sector, it is conceivable that IEA recommendations help set standards and regulations for its 
member countries. 
 
When the G8 (discussed more in the next subsection) turned its attention to climate and energy during the 
2005 Gleneagles Summit, it turned to the IEA for help. The IEA responded vigorously with a variety of 
publications, dialogues, and policy recommendations. The Summit's Plan of Action asked the IEA to 
conduct research, analysis and make policy recommendations in several areas: energy efficiency in 
buildings, appliances, transport and industry; cleaner fossil-fuels; carbon capture and storage; and 
renewable energy. The IEA submitted a report – Towards a Sustainable Energy Future—IEA Programme 
of Work on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development – to the G8 in 2008 that 
addressed the Gleneagles Plan of Action. The report, amongst a host of other things, contained 25 energy 
efficiency policy recommendations, and progress reports on the IEA's dialogue with Brazil, China, India, 
Russia and South Africa on sustainable energy policies (IEA, 2008b). 
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The IEA had also been asked at the G8 Gleneagles summit to advise on alternative energy scenario 
models. Drawing on its prior work, the IEA produced publications such as the 2006 and 2008 Energy 
Technology Perspectives: Scenarios and Strategies to 2050, which detailed alternative scenarios models 
for greenhouse gas emission cuts through the use of new technologies and mapped the policies that could 
achieve those cuts (IEA, 2008b). The energy technology perspectives study argued that sustainable 
energy development required the use of a broad range of new and innovative technologies including 
improved energy efficiency devices, carbon capture and storage, renewable energy, and nuclear power 
systems. 
 
The IEA also exemplifies one of the most important issues in global governance: how to respond to the 
rise of emerging powers, particularly India and China. Across the board, IGOs face new challenges 
related to the rapid growth of such “emerging markets” as China and India, which had little role in 
creating most IGOs and which are generally underrepresented in their governance. The IEA is a 
particularly pressing example. 
 
Since its membership is legally limited to the OECD countries (all OECD members except Iceland and 
Mexico are part of the IEA) and excludes large oil consumers like China and India, many have questioned 
the agency's capacity to deal with future oil shocks. Given the projected rapid rise in energy demand in 
developing countries outside of the OECD, any collective action to strengthen IEA's emergency response 
system, to increase energy policy coordination and to reduce the environmental impact of global oil 
demand, has to include inputs and cooperation from all major oil-consuming countries. Nobuo Tanaka, 
who became IEA executive director in 2007, has in various public statements recognized the necessity of 
including China and India in IEA collaborations, with an eventual goal of making them members of the 
agency. Making China and India members would entail modifying the 1974 International Energy Program 
agreement. To date, this has not been fully explored, although the Obama administration has shown 
interest in encouraging such an outcome. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had suggested in response to 
questions from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during her confirmation hearing in January 2009, 
that the IEA should begin laying the groundwork for Chinese and Indian membership, and that the State 
Department would support its efforts (Snow, 2009). 
 
3.2. The Group of Eight (G8) 
The IEA was not the only global governance mechanism to arise from the first oil price shock. The 
macroeconomic disruption that resulted in the mid-1970s provoked the leaders of what were then the 
world's most important economies to meet to coordinate their economic policies. The first summit of what 
eventually became the Group of Eight, or G8, took place in 1975 in France with a meeting of the heads of 
government of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US, and expanded when Canada joined the 
following year to create the G7 (not to be confused with the still-existing G7, which consists of the 
finance ministers of those countries). The meetings were originally intended as small and informal 
gatherings of likeminded government leaders (all cold war allies) to deal primarily with the coordination 
of macroeconomic policies (Barry, 2000). By the late 1970s, the nature of these meetings had expanded to 
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include political and security issues. The G8 was created when Russia became a full member in 1997 (G8, 
2006). 
 
Summit processes like the G8 represent a halfway house between the formal institutionalization of IGOs 
and the everyday processes of diplomacy among governments. The G8 is not a formal organization, as it 
has no charter, no permanent secretariat or home, no fixed membership, and no formal criteria for 
admission. Nonetheless, every year since the mid-1970s the leaders of a handful of the world's most 
powerful states have come together in a headline-grabbing summit that – at least in theory – makes it 
possible to overcome the bureaucratic divisions within each country's foreign policy and bargain across 
issue areas, as well as coordinate policies more quickly and flexibly. 
 
Oil prices galvanized the leaders into creating what became the G8, and oil prices long remained almost 
the sole energy issue addressed.7 This began to change by 2000, partly because as the host of the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations on climate change and the 2000 G8 Summit, Japan wanted a new initiative 
on renewable energy; a promising renewable energy task force was created (Kirton, 2006a, b). However, 
the recommendations of the task force were allowed to die by the following summit when the new US 
administration under President George W. Bush expressed no interest in pursuing them. 
 
By 2004, however, G8 leaders had their attention turned to energy again when oil prices increased, and 
concerns over dependence on Middle East oil and terrorism loomed large. There was also an increase in 
publicity over climate change issues when host Prime Minister Tony Blair put it at the top of the agenda 
at the 2005 G8 summit in the UK. The 2005 G8 summit was ground-breaking, in that numerous strong 
commitments were made on climate change, clean energy and sustainable development. A study noted 
that there were a total of 63 commitment statements in the climate change and energy area in the form of 
the Gleneagles Plan of Action, which was a significant increase from previous years (Kirton and 
Kokotsis, 2005). At the conclusion of the summit, G8 leaders effectively assigned tasks to the IEA and 
the World Bank: the IEA was to look into alternative energy scenarios, and the World Bank was to create 
a framework for investment and financing on clean energy initiatives (G8, 2005). The IEA published its 
alternative energy scenarios report in 2008, and the World Bank came up with a report on an investment 
framework action plan in 2007. 
 
Whether the G8 thereby emerged as a significant and effective global governance mechanism remains a 
matter of debate. Formally, the G8 member countries complied with their Gleneagles commitments by 
participating in the UN Climate Change Conference a few months later and signing on its various 
agreements, including one to move forward on post-2012 emissions reduction negotiations and another to 
accept previously negotiated accords on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (the latter applied only to 
Kyoto Protocol parties and thus did not affect the United States). There was also much buzz on creating 
clean energy initiatives at the domestic level in member countries after the 2005 summit. For instance, the 
US created the Advanced Energy Initiative that increased clean energy research by 22% at the 
Department of Energy (Kirton, 2006a, b). 
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However, given that greenhouse gas emissions have continued to rise in all G8 member countries and the 
lack of significant advances at subsequent G8 meetings, the importance of this formal compliance is 
questionable.8 (Indeed, according to the United Nations overall emissions from G8 countries rose an 
average of 2% each year from 2000 to 2005, see Doyle, 2007). National data submitted to the UN's 
Climate Change Secretariat show that overall emissions by G8 nations rose 2.0% from 2000 to 14.3 
billion tonnes in 2005 and were up 0.7% since 1990, the base year for the UN's Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The emphasis on clean energy and climate change at the 2005 G8 summit had apparently set the bar too 
high, for G8 attention at the next two summits paled in comparison. The 2006 St. Petersburg G8 summit 
hosted by Russia, for example, had energy security as one of three major area priorities. However, 
compared to the follow-through on commitments made over the previous year, an independent analysis of 
several key commitments made at the 2006 St. Petersburg G8 summit found that only one of the 
commitments made in the energy security area – the collecting and reporting of oil and other energy data 
for the Oil and Energy Reserve Data (JODI) initiative – secured full compliance by all member countries 
(Kolenda et al., 2007). The 2007 G8 Summit at Heiligendamm fared no better in relation to energy issues. 
The most concrete outcome was a G8 acknowledgment of an EU proposal on an energy efficiency 
initiative, along with an agreement to work with the IEA on promoting energy efficiency internationally. 
 
Yet it is too soon to give up on the G8 processes as potentially significant sources of global energy 
governance. The 2008 G8 Summit at Hokkaido Toyako saw G8 leaders make firm commitments on 
energy issues, including one to adopt in the UNFCCC negotiations the goal of achieving at least 50% 
reduction of global emissions by 2050, where in the previous year they had only considered it. And they 
also committed to increase investment in new energy technologies, pledging billions of dollars into 
special funds (although as of early 2009 details on the distribution of these funds remain limited). G8 
leaders invited India, China and South Korea to join them in establishing an International Partnership for 
Energy Efficiency Cooperation. Additionally, G8 leaders agreed to implement 25 domestic policies 
recommended by the IEA that aimed to improve energy efficiency and reduce energy use although to date 
it appears that none of the G8 countries have fully followed through on policy implementation (Martell et 
al., 2009). 
 
3.3. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
A major arena of global governance comes in the form of economic and technical assistance provided to 
developing country national governments to facilitate public goods provision by IGOs known as 
multilateral development banks (MDBs). Such assistance both reflects and helps shape global agendas on 
how countries should run their economies and what paths they should follow to promote economic 
development. The best known of these banks is the World Bank Group, which consist of three 
Washington, DC-based institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association. The role that these 
banks play in shaping national energy programs has come under intensive scrutiny in the literature in the 
past few years (for an overview, see Florini, 2009). But the other MDBs, which function at a regional 
level, merit similar scrutiny for their extensive influence on energy policy. Of particular importance is the 
Asian Development Bank, headquartered in Manila, which is helping to shape Asia's rapidly growing 
energy infrastructure. 
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Regional development banks provide loans to their member governments with funds borrowed from 
global capital markets. Such banks were developed in the 1950s and 1960s as a way to foster economic 
development in Africa, Asia, and South America. In case of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), it was 
argued that an Asian Bank was needed to familiarize donors and investors with Asian needs and demands, 
and that an Asian Bank would create a greater sense of regional cooperation (Boas and McNeill, 2003, pp. 
35–38). 
 
The ADB was therefore created in December of 1966 and headquartered in Manila with 31 country 
members to explicitly foster economic growth and cooperation in all of Asia, at the time a largely 
agricultural region (Kappagoda, 1995). According to the bank itself, the ADB focused much of its 
assistance during its first decade on food production and rural agricultural development. However, as was 
also the case with the World Bank, loan portfolios changed over time, driven by lessons learned from 
development assistance successes and failures and by new thinking on the part of donor countries and 
Bank staff. Assistance expanded into education and healthcare in the 1970s and near the end of the decade 
started focusing intensely on infrastructure development and improving roads and access to electricity. 
ADB shifted its strategy of loaning to support more domestic energy projects after the second oil shock in 
1979, and also widened its portfolio to include microfinance, environmental, educational, and gender-
related issues in the 1980s and 1990s (Asian Development Bank, 2009). During this time, the ADB 
broadened its stated mission to include not only economic development, but also “social” development 
and “good governance,” and began offering not only loans but also technical assistance, advice, and 
information. 
 
Today, the ADB is a multilateral development bank with 67 international members, 42 client countries, 
and about $7 billion worth of project lending every year (Asian Development Bank, 2007, 2008). Member 
countries include those donating money and support to the ADB; client countries are those countries 
receiving loans and aid. The two largest donors, each with a 15.5% share, are Japan and the United States. 
The ADB provided $133 billion worth of cumulative loans as of 2007, a majority of which went to energy 
or energy-related activities: $32.4 billion for transportation, $26.1 billion for electricity and energy, $16.6 
billion for extractive industries and natural resources. Most individual ADB projects are in the $100 
million range, and the ADB has begun emphasizing specific projects aimed at promoting investment in 
energy efficiency and renewable resources through their “Clean Energy Program.”9 ADB officials also 
believe that competition spurs entrepreneurial innovation and stimulates more domestic and foreign 
investment, promoting the ultimate goal of development (Carmody and Ritchie, 2007). Officials at the 
ADB predominately see investments in energy infrastructure as a way to alleviate poverty, facilitate 
market liberalization and restructuring, increase the use of cleaner burning fuels (such as natural gas) 
within Asia, and enhance regional cooperation on energy issues. 
 
Controversially, the ADB claims that one of the benefits to its approach is that it improves equitable 
access to energy services for those who are disenfranchised, an area not always addressed by the private 
sector or by governments. Increasing access to electricity and natural gas for the poor and marginalized, 
especially the rural poor, and creating employment, especially for small to medium size enterprises, are 
listed among the ADB's core goals (Asian Development Bank, 2003). The ADB also views energy 
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projects as a way to bring indirect benefits such as improved infrastructure, health care, education, 
telecommunications, and other quality of life measures that raise productivity and grow economies. 
 
The ADB argues that market restructuring and liberalization are key steps toward its goals of poverty 
alleviation and economic development (the ADB even manages a series of “Energy Sector Restructuring 
Programs”).10 Countries wishing to receive ADB loans for electricity transmission and distribution 
systems, for instance, have to also agree to reform their transmission sectors so that generation, 
transmission, and distribution assets are unbundled and privatized. The ADB envisions market 
deregulation and privatization, especially public–private partnerships, as instrumental in achieving “good 
governance” and competitive markets. In order to participate in ADB projects, bidders must undergo what 
the ADB calls a prequalification process and commit themselves to many of the ADB's preferred reforms. 
 
One of the drawbacks to the ADB's approach to energy, is that the organization must ensure that its loans 
provide revenues for the organization. Despite a review process that includes various proposals, concept 
papers, internal staff committee review meetings, and management review meetings that are geared to 
only approve the “most selective” projects, the ADB has rarely turned down loans. Additionally, because 
the largest donors to the organization are Japan and the United States, some local aid recipients have 
expressed a concern ADB investment is merely a proxy for Japanese or American hegemony (Wan, 
1995). The ADB periodically reviews its performance in the energy sector, and its most recent internal 
assessment cautioned that the organization's lending strategy needed to do more to reduce fuel costs, 
accelerate the rate of energy market reforms and power purchase agreements, improve investor 
confidence, and provide clear price signals so that investments are made in energy efficiency and 
renewable electricity supply (Asian Development Bank, 2006). Lastly, while the ADB has publicly 
endorsed investments in cleaner forms of supply, most of its lending is still tied to environmentally 
damaging fuels such as coal and oil (Constantino et al., 2005). Between 1966 and 2004, only 1.82% of its 
energy project lending went to renewable energy or energy efficiency (Greenpeace, 2007). 
 
3.4. The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) 
Governments and the inter-governmental organizations they create are not the only important actors in 
global governance. Increasingly, the world is being shaped by other actors at smaller scales, including 
everything from transnational networks of advocacy NGOs to quasi-regulatory private bodies and global 
policy networks (such as REN21, an organization focused exclusively on distributing policy advice to 
legislators and parliamentarians relating to renewable energy regulations and standards). Given the 
paucity of formal governance mechanisms dealing with international energy governance, it is not 
surprising that a host of alternatives are being tried. Among these are several hybrid entities, involving 
both governments and non-governmental actors. 
 
The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) exemplifies the hybridized entitles 
increasingly common on the global governance scene. Deeply influenced by discussions in the G8 
Renewable Energy Task Force relating to renewable energy and sustainability prior to the 2001 summit, a 
collection of regulators, businesses, banks, and non-governmental organizations decided to establish 
REEEP in 2002 in the United Kingdom, where it was located in the United Kingdom Foreign and 
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Commonwealth Office. For 2 years the organization conducted workshops and identified renewable 
energy and energy efficiency stakeholders with the United States before it was formally established as an 
international non-governmental organization in Vienna, Austria, in 2004 (REEEP, 2009). 
 
REEEP's mission focuses on three core areas: reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving access to 
reliable and clean forms of energy in developing countries, and promoting energy efficiency. Unlike IGOs 
such as the International Energy Agency and the newly formed International Renewable Energy 
Association (IRENA), REEEP is funded primarily by voluntary contributions and/or does not have 
restricted membership. REEEP attempts to only fund those projects that could have the potential to be 
widely replicated in many different regulatory frameworks and a variety of countries and energy markets. 
It thus emphasizes projects that have high potential for mass replicability. One key component of its 
mission is to influence the legal and political barriers to clean energy by utilizing lawyers and technical 
experts to challenge government regulation and policy. Another important component is financing 
projects that have the capacity to attract investors and financiers that can then develop and deploy more 
sustainable technologies in other markets. 
 
REEEP receives its funding from governments and a collection of banks, other non-governmental 
organizations, and businesses. The decision-making power for financing projects rests with a governing 
board. This board consists of 19 partners and is currently chaired by the UK Department for Environment, 
Food, and Rural Affairs. REEEP's international secretariat is positioned in Vienna and acts as a “central 
service hub” for information dissemination and the provision of support to regional secretaries, of which 
there are 18 spread across the world. The organization also has an International Director (responsible for 
overall strategy), a finance committee (responsible for the budget), and a steering committee (responsible 
for development of regional action plans) (REEEP, 2009). 
 
As of program year 2008, REEEP had 44 government partners, 180 private partners (mostly NGOs, 
banks, and businesses) and six inter-governmental partners (the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, United Nations Environment Program, African Development Bank, European Commission, 
Cogen 3 in Thailand, and the Organization of American States). The organization manages a €6.1 million 
annual operating budget and received most of its funding from Norway and the United Kingdom (and it 
expended €16.4 million between 2003 and the end of 2007). The 2008 program year saw REEEP running 
145 projects worth a total cumulative investment of €65 million, most of this leveraged from REEEP 
partners through equity financing, and plans for 37 new ones. These new projects included the promotion 
of solar water heaters in Uganda, energy efficient lighting in India, rural biomass development in China, 
renewable energy financing in Mexico, and assessing the regulatory framework for renewable energy in 
Argentina (United Nations Division for Sustainable Development, 2007). 
 
Its distinct structure, mission, and approach to funding make REEEP – and other hybrid entities – –
fundamentally different from other global energy governors. The organization operates on a much smaller 
scale than inter-governmental organizations like the IEA or development banks such as the World Bank 
and ADB. REEEP focuses on facilitation and capacity building while the IEA oversees the oil stockpile 
systems and conducts policy research for its members and multilateral development banks focus on large-
 15 
 
scale funding and project implementation. Furthermore, whereas other global actors predominately 
interact with governments, the majority of REEEP's partners are bankers, financiers, and NGO managers. 
One benefit to this structure is its operational flexibility and efficiency; since the organization is small and 
can deal with actors on a much smaller scale, it can often hold these actors more accountable for their 
decisions. A second benefit is the dynamic relationship between REEEP and its partners. Almost constant 
interaction creates an inclusive and transparent process that generates rapid feedback about REEEP 
projects among partners. Partners have a direct opportunity to influence REEEP activities through 
meetings and consultations, and REEEP also prefers to let most partners micromanage their own projects. 
REEEP managers argue that this tends to enhance the effectiveness of implementation – done by people 
on the ground – rather than imposing a top-down “one-size-fits-all” approach to renewable energy and 
energy efficiency (REEEP, 2006, p. 6). 
 
The downside is that because REEEP tends to implement small-scale and distributed projects, it must 
manage hundreds of individual projects in order to make significant contributions to a country's energy 
portfolio (unlike a nuclear power plant provider that can install a massive $6 billion, 1100 MW power 
plant in one go). In addition, REEEP's “partnership approach” can delay projects and reduce operational 
efficiency. Unlike developmental and inter-governmental institutions, REEEP partners and sponsors do 
not commit to annual contributions, so the organization's horizon for planning projects is always short-
term. Lastly, since REEEP (like most hybrids) is so new, compared to other global governors it has only a 
limited track record and is still in its infancy. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has briefly touched upon a handful of the many global governors currently influencing energy 
policies and practices around the world. Complete coverage would fill volumes, including everything 
from OPEC and the Energy Charter Treaty to the energy implications of World Trade Organization rules 
and the impacts of investment treaties on energy investments and regulations. Also included would be not 
only multi-sectors hybrids like REEEP, but the vast array of international NGOs on energy and 
environment issues as well as the entire sector of multinational corporations in the energy field. 
 
But this overview is not intended as an encyclopedia. Instead, the point is to illustrate the variety of types 
of mechanisms available to address the daunting issues requiring some degree of global energy 
governance. And those issues are daunting indeed, from the struggle to ensure a stable climate, to the 
need to make energy services available to the world's two billion energy poor, to the geopolitical 
challenges of global oil trade. The existing institutions to date have failed to develop the necessary rules 
and channel the necessary resources to meet these challenges. Moreover, many have limited membership 
or are mandated to address only a small subset of energy issues, and there is little coordination among 
them. The IEA and G8 exclude major energy producers and consumers, and other relevant institutions are 
mandated to address only some of the challenges energy policies must address (See Table 1). Much cross-
border energy governance, to the degree it occurs at all, is divided up by energy source or sector: the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for nuclear power; the Energy Charter Treaty for a handful of 
Eurasian oil and gas pipelines, REEEP for energy efficiency and renewable energy, the multilateral 
development banks for various types of financing. 
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Table 1. Summary of our sample of global governance institutions. 
Institution Form of global 
governance 
Date of 
creation 
Central 
location 
Primary function Description 
International 
energy agency 
Intergovernmental 
organization (IGO) 
1974 Paris, 
France 
To establish a 
reporting system on 
oil prices and create 
an emergency oil-
sharing system 
The IEA has been relatively 
successful at coordinating 
national action on energy and the 
primary producer of global 
energy statistics. However, 
membership excludes a 
significant number of oil 
producing and consuming states, 
including China and India 
Group of eight Summit process 1975/1997 – To provide an 
informal and small 
forum for 
government leaders 
to discuss policy 
coordination 
The G8 has been consistently 
used by national governments to 
announce energy and climate 
change commitments. However, 
The G8 lacks the formality of an 
IGO and has no charter, 
secretariat, home, or fixed 
membership 
Asian 
Development 
Bank 
Multilateral 
financial institution 
1966 Manila, 
Philippines 
To facilitate 
economic 
development and 
reduce poverty 
The ADB has provided billions of 
dollars of energy infrastructure 
lending and restructured energy 
and electricity markets. However, 
the ADB focuses only capital-
intensive projects that maximize 
revenues for the bank, is 
sometimes viewed as a proxy for 
Japanese and American 
hegemony, and has largely 
invested in fossil-fuels 
Renewable 
energy and 
energy 
efficiency 
partnership 
Public private 
partnership/hybrid 
2002 Vienna, 
Austria 
To reduce 
greenhouse gas 
emissions, improve 
access to reliable 
and clean forms of 
energy in 
developing 
countries, and 
promote energy 
efficiency 
Has formed partnerships with 
more than 120 governments, 
banks, businesses, 
nongovernmental organizations, 
and IGOs and invested €16.4 
million in more than 145 projects. 
However, REEEP implements 
only small-scale projects and lack 
of permanent funding forces the 
agency to focus on the short-term 
 
It is unlikely that any overarching inter-governmental organization or regime will bring the major energy 
players together to harmonize their energy policies to the benefit of all. There is not, and is not likely to 
be, a single overarching World Energy Organization with comprehensive membership, much less 
anything like a world government able to set energy policy for the planet as a whole. Rather, we are likely 
to continue to see in the energy field the same phenomena that are occurring in most issue areas on the 
global agenda: an array of different types of actors, with widely ranging claims to legitimate authority, 
attempting to set rules on different parts of the energy mosaic, often in conflicting and contradictory 
 17 
 
ways. Therefore, it is imperative that policymakers understand the strengths and weaknesses of the types 
of global energy governance mechanisms at their disposal. 
 
The four exemplars described above provide an initial basis for that understanding, especially as far as it 
illuminates challenges. IGOs like the IEA suffer certain chronic shortcomings. They are prey to the very 
free-rider problems they are intended to help states overcome, with each member country hoping to 
contribute as little as possible but to maximize what it receives in return. The standard result is that all 
IGOs are under-resourced compared to the mandates states impose on them. They also tend to suffer from 
shortcomings endemic to bureaucracies everywhere, from turf battles, contests over jurisdiction and 
domain, to mission creep, the expansion of an organization beyond its original goals (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004). Nonetheless, they can be useful, even indispensable, as the G8 leaders found when 
they needed somewhere to turn for quick expertise. 
 
Summit processes like the G8, according to their advocates, are the most plausible solution to the 
conundrums of global governance – small enough to provide space for real discussion and meeting of 
minds, but large enough to include powerful national leaders that exert significance influence on global 
problems. Because the participants are government leaders, there is no international bureaucracy created 
that would raise questions of accountability – but also none that can carry out action on a long-term basis. 
The G8 itself has been roundly criticized for its extremely exclusive, and therefore illegitimate, nature, 
with Canadian analysts and former policymakers leading the charge for an expansion to something on the 
order of a G20. The current economic crisis and the heavy reliance on a newly empowered G20 is testing 
their claim that this expanded summit process can serve as an effective mechanism of global governance. 
 
The multilateral developments banks are, of course, a subset of IGOs, but they have such special 
characteristics that they need to be analyzed as a distinct category. Most important, they have financial 
resources and frequently channel prodigious levels of investment, both directly and by providing a “Good 
Housekeeping” seal of approval that attracts investments from the private sector. Yet their roles in 
marshaling investment and influencing policy remains highly controversial, with long-standing debates 
over the equity of their internal decision-making processes, their legitimacy and accountability to the 
people whose lives are affected by their funding and policy preferences, their competence, and the 
appropriateness of their agendas. 
 
The “hybrid” organizations that include, and are sometimes solely comprised of, non-state actors are the 
newest and least understood actors in global governance. One major concern here is accountability. If 
citizens do not like something a public–private partnership is doing, existing political mechanisms of 
accountability may not be adequate to provide redress against private actors. Another, from the opposite 
side of the spectrum, is how to build on success. Partnerships involving governments, for-profit 
companies, and non-profits usually require a lengthy evolution for the different sectors to get to know one 
another and learn how to work together. Scaling up relatively small-scale undertakings like REEEP is 
difficult to do quickly, if it can be done at all. 
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In short, none of the existing forms of global governance adequately match the nature and scope of global 
energy challenges. Energy policymaking tends to be highly disjointed at the national level, even more so 
at the international level. Given the extreme urgency of dealing effectively with global energy policy to 
confront climate change, geopolitical tensions, and economic vulnerabilities, an effective collaboration 
between energy policy researchers and global governance scholars is long overdue. 
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Endnotes 
1  Even in Europe, where states have made remarkable progress in reducing air pollution such as acid rain, 
ecologists have found that the mean pH in acidified streams has still increased by 0.3–0.4 units every 10 years. See 
Kowalik et al. (2007). 
2     The literature on global issue governance extends well beyond the obvious areas such as trade policy. For 
example, global health governance is the focus of numerous articles, books, conferences, and processes to bring 
policy analysis to the attention of policymakers. A very partial list of recent publications would include Thomas and 
Weber (2004), Arhin-Tenkorang and Conceicao (2003), Dodgson et al. 2002, Fidler (2007), Lee (2004), Lee (2009) 
and Cooper et al. (2007). 
3  The puzzle of international agreements is not why states sometimes fail to comply with their terms when 
those terms are costly, but why we see as much compliance as we do. Given the anarchical nature of world order, 
very low levels of compliance would seem rational. Explanations vary, from the socialization of state actors into 
international norms, to expectations for long-term reciprocity. 
4 There is no agreed vocabulary to describe the various types of organizations that populate the international 
scene. “International organization” is the term most commonly used to describe the United Nations and its ilk, but 
that term is also sometimes used to refer to groups of non-governmental actors. “International institution” is 
frequently used in the social science literature to refer to sets of rules and rule-making processes, rather than formal 
organizations. We thus use the term inter-governmental organization (IGO) to make clear when we are referring to a 
specific set of organizations with the characteristics described above. 
5 See http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart_en.pdf for an overview of those affiliated with the United Nations. 
6 The term “neo-liberal” has a second, very different meaning. As used in political economy, the term refers 
to the set of understandings that underlay the Washington Consensus approach to economic development, relying on 
free markets and with a minimal role for governments. 
7     For an excellent overview of the G8 and energy issues through 2005, see Kirton (2006a, b). 
8 After the Lyons Summit in 1996 and the Denver Summit in 1997, G8 members committed to publishing 
compliance assessments to determine the effectiveness of the organization on certain issues. Readers interested in 
these assessments can see G8 Information Centre (2007) or visit 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/methodology/compint.htm and http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/compliance/. 
9 More details about the ADB's Clean Energy Program can be found at http://www.adb.org/clean-
energy/default.asp. 
10 It should be noted that there is a huge controversy raging around the world on the relationship between the 
market liberalization agenda and economic development, with critics arguing that liberalization and privatization 
can have the effect of increasing rather than reducing poverty, especially in the short run. 
